Mapping Transnational Crime in El Salvador: New Trends and Lessons from Colombia by Farah, Douglas
Florida International University
FIU Digital Commons
Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center
8-1-2011
Mapping Transnational Crime in El Salvador: New
Trends and Lessons from Colombia
Douglas Farah
International Assessment and Strategy Center
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/whemsac
This work is brought to you for free and open access by FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western Hemisphere Security
Analysis Center by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Farah, Douglas, "Mapping Transnational Crime in El Salvador: New Trends and Lessons from Colombia" (2011). Western Hemisphere
Security Analysis Center. Paper 29.
http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/whemsac/29
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mapping Transnational 
Crime in El Salvador:  
New Trends and Lessons from 
Colombia 
Douglas Farah
 
International Assessment and
Strategy Center
 
August 2011
  
 
This report is based in significant part on research in El Salvador and  
Guatemala carried out in the past year with the support of the 
International Assessment and Strategy Center.
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mapping Transnational 
Crime in El Salvador:  
New Trends and Lessons from 
Colombia 
Douglas Farah
 
International Assessment and
Strategy Center
 
August 2011
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The views expressed in this research paper are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or 
position of the US Government, Department of Defense, US 
Southern Command or Florida International University.
1 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Since El Salvador‟s civil war formally ended in 1992 the 
small Central American nation has undergone profound 
social changes and significant reforms. However, few 
changes have been as important or as devastating as the 
nation‟s emergence as a central hub in the transnational 
criminal “pipeline” or series of recombinant, overlapping 
chains of routes and actors that illicit organizations use to 
traffic in drugs, money, weapons, human being, endangered 
animals and other products. 
 
The erasing of the once-clear ideological lines that drove the 
civil war and the ability of erstwhile enemies to join forces in 
criminal enterprises in the post-war period is an enduring and 
dangerous characteristic of El Salvador‟s transnational 
criminal evolution.  Trained, elite cadres from both sides, 
with few legitimate job opportunities, found their skills were 
marketable in the growing criminal structures. The groups 
moved from kidnapping and extortion to providing 
protection services to transnational criminal organizations to 
becoming integral parts of the organizations themselves. 
 
The demand for specialized military and transportation 
services in El Salvador have exploded as the Mexican DTOs 
consolidate their hold on the cocaine market and their 
relationships with the transportista networks, which is still in 
flux. The value of their services has risen dramatically also 
because of the fact that multiple Mexican DTOs, at war with 
each other in Mexico and seeking to physically control the 
geographic space of the lucrative pipeline routes in from 
Guatemala to Panama, are eager to increase their military 
capabilities and intelligence gathering capacities. 
 
The emergence of multiple non-state armed groups, often 
with significant ties to the formal political structure (state) 
2 
 
through webs of judicial, legislative and administrative 
corruption, has some striking parallels to Colombia in the 
1980s, where multiple types of violence ultimately 
challenged the sovereignty of state and left a lasting legacy 
of embedded corruption within the nation‟s political 
structure.  
 
Organized crime in El Salvador is now transnational in 
nature and more integrated into stronger, more versatile 
global networks such as the Mexican DTOs. It is a hybrid of 
both local crime ―with gangs vying for control of specific 
geographic space so they can extract payment for the safe 
passage of illicit products― and transnational groups that 
need to use that space to successfully move their products. 
These symbiotic relationships are both complex and 
generally transient in nature but growing more consolidated 
and dangerous. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Since El Salvador‟s civil war formally ended in 1992 the 
small Central American nation has undergone profound 
social changes and significant reforms. However, few 
changes have been as important or as devastating as the 
nation‟s emergence as a central hub in the transnational 
criminal “pipeline” or series of recombinant, overlapping 
chains of routes and actors that illicit organizations use to 
traffic in drugs, money, weapons, human being, endangered 
animals and other products.  
 
The emergence of multiple non-state armed groups, often 
with significant ties to the formal political structure (state) 
through webs of judicial, legislative and administrative 
corruption, has some striking parallels to Colombia in the 
1980s, where a plethora of violent groups ultimately 
challenged the sovereignty of state and left a lasting legacy 
of embedded corruption within the nation‟s political 
structure. In cases, multiple porous borders and historic 
smuggling routes, the accompanying “cultures of 
contraband”1 and the historic abandonment of the state of 
significant geographic zones ―particularly border regions― 
have led to violence and illicit smuggling activities.
2
 
                                                             
1
 For an examination of the “cultures of contraband” and their 
implications in the region see: Rebecca B. Galemba, “Cultures of 
Contraband: Contesting the Illegality at the Mexico-Guatemala Border,” 
Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University Department of Anthropology, May 
2009. 
2
 The author, a former Washington Post correspondent, lived in El 
Salvador from 1985-1990, covering the civil wars, and in Colombia from 
1990-1992 covering the drug wars. From 1992-1997 he lived in El 
Salvador again but continued to regularly cover the Andean drug wars. 
From 1997-2000 he covered drug trafficking on a broader scale as the 
Post‟s international investigative correspondent. Since 2008, as a 
consultant, Farah has visited both Colombia and Central America 
frequently to work on transnational criminal issues. The interviews cited 
in this report were with a broad range of law enforcement and 
4 
 
Unlike Colombia, El Salvador, aside from the human 
trafficking element, has little to contribute in terms of 
product, to the lucrative illicit pipelines. What it offers is a 
prime geographic location with sophisticated transportation 
networks that have extensive reach southward to the 
production areas of cocaine and northward to the Mexican 
drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) that now control the 
bulk of the cocaine trade into the world‟s most lucrative 
market, the United States. Because of its geographic 
location, El Salvador is sometimes referred to in drug 
trafficking circles as “El Caminito” or the Little Pathway, 
which cuts across the north of El Salvador, from the border 
with Honduras to the border with Guatemala, carrying drugs 
heading from Colombia to Mexico and the United States.
3
 
 
"El Caminito” 
 
Source: http://www.elfaro.net/es/201105/noticias/4079/. 
                                                                                                                            
intelligence officials in Central America, as well as sources involved in 
transnational criminal activities and gangs. Due to the risk the sources 
would run if identified by name, their information is used anonymously. 
3
 http://insightcrime.org/insight-latest-news/item/939-texis-cartel-
controls-el-salvador-cocaine-route. 
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The transportista networks, protected by corrupt officials in 
the police, military, judiciary, customs, immigration and 
National Assembly, are the value added that Salvadoran 
organized criminal structures bring to the current drug 
trafficking structures. As will be examined below, two 
particular local networks, the Cartel de Texis and Los 
Perrones Orientales, clearly demonstrate this capture of 
specific parts of the State while strengthening their ties to 
Mexican organizations. 
 
As one observer recently noted: 
 
The role the region plays is simple, but the 
consequences are devastating. Smugglers in 
Central America serve one vital purpose: to 
transport drugs between South America and 
Mexico. For that reason, they are known in 
the region as 'transportistas.' Increasingly, 
however, these organizations have also taken 
on the role of local distributors and, in some 
cases, the suppliers of marijuana and poppy, 
for the production of heroin, as well as 
importers and suppliers for the raw 
ingredients of synthetic drugs that are 
manufactured in Mexico, Nicaragua and 
possibly Honduras.
4
 
 
The growth of these transportista networks and other 
developments discussed below are part of what the recent 
Obama administration‟s National Strategy to Combat 
Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) aptly noted is a trend 
where “TOC networks are proliferating, striking new and 
                                                             
4
 Steven Dudley, “Central America‟s „Transportistas,‟” InSight: 
Organized Crime in the Americas, November 21, 2010, accessed at: 
http://insightcrime.org/investigations/insight-exclusives/item/255-
insight-brief-central-americas-transportistas.  
6 
 
powerful alliances, and engaging in a range of illicit 
activities as never before.  The result is a convergence of 
threats that have evolved to become more complex, volatile, 
and destabilizing.”5 
 
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE  
 
These pipelines‟ pathways through El Salvador are not new 
and have almost always been linked to illicit networks in 
neighboring countries, particularly in Guatemala, Honduras 
and Nicaragua. These linkages remain important today. 
While not the topic of this paper, these linkages cannot be 
ignored in understanding the emerging criminal structures in 
El Salvador and the region.  
 
During the nation‟s civil war in the 1980s the Marxist-led 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (Frente 
Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional-FMLN) 
developed extensive smuggling networks through Nicaragua 
and Honduras for its weapons supplies and logistical 
support.
6
 The far right maintained significant clandestine 
networks through Guatemala, particularly for back channel 
                                                             
5
 “FACT SHEET: Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime,” 
Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, press release, July 25, 
2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/25/fact-sheet-
strategy-combat-transnational-organized-crime.  
6
 The most clearly documented case in recent times of the former FMLN 
groups operating is the case of Jose Luis Merino, AKA Ramiro, who was 
a Communist Party urban commando during the war and implicated in 
kidnappings in the mid-1990s and weapons sales to the FARC rebels in 
Colombia as late as 2008. For details of Merino's alleged ties, see: José 
de Córdoba, "The Man Behind the Man," Poder 360 Magazine, April 
2009; Douglas Farah, "The FARC's International Relations: A Network 
of Deception, NEFA Foundation, September 22, 2008; José de Córdoba, 
" Chávez Ally May Have Aided Colombian Guerrillas: Emails Seem to 
Tie Figure to a Weapons Deal," The Wall Street Journal, August 28, 
2008.  
7 
 
intelligence sharing and the movement of arms and 
personnel.
7
 
 
 As far back as early 1990, almost immediately after the war 
in El Salvador ended, there were media reports on the 
growing role of Central America as a transshipment point for 
drugs, primarily cocaine, to the United States.
8
 There were 
even published reports by a former agent of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) saying Medellin cartel 
leader Pablo Escobar had met with then-president Vinicio 
Cerezo of Guatemala to arrange for the transshipment of 
large amounts of cocaine through Central America.
9
 
 
A major investigation of post‐conflict armed groups in 1994 
found that the “illegal armed groups” operating after the war 
had “morphed” into more sophisticated, complex 
organizations than had existed during the war, and that, as 
self‐financing entities they had a strong criminal economic 
component, as well as political aspect, to their operations. 
This was among the first serious efforts to identify the 
enduring clandestine structures of the civil war as new 
                                                             
7
 For a look at the enduring network in Central America, see: “Células 
nunca se desactivaron,” La Prensa Gráfica (El Salvador), August 31, 
2010, accessed at: 
http://www.laprensagrafica.com/internacionales/latinoamerica/131431-
celulas-nunca-se-desactivaron.html.   
8
 See, for example: Shirley Christian, “Central America a New Drug 
Focus,” The New York Times, December 16, 1991, p. A10, where she 
described the movement of cocaine by “using private planes, small boats, 
tractor-trailer rigs and other vehicles.” See also: Lindsey Gruson, “Drug 
Trafficking and Poppy Growing Find Lush Home in Guatemala,” 
October 17, 1989. In his article, Gruson noted that Guatemala is “almost 
exactly halfway between the Colombian cocaine processing laboratories 
and the American markets.” 
9
 “Castillo: Pablo Escobar se reunió con Vinicio Cerezo,” Siglo XXI 
(Guatemala), July 31, 1996. 
8 
 
elements in the country‟s nascent transitional organized 
crime structure.
10
 
 
The early illicit groups that grew out of the war were initially 
engaged in kidnappings, both in El Salvador and abroad. The 
early abductions were carried out primarily by members of 
the Communist Party who never demobilized after the war, 
but often acting at the behest of extreme right and financed 
by their one-time ideological enemies.  
 
THE NEW AND THE DANGEROUS 
  
This erasing of the once-clear ideological lines and the 
ability of erstwhile enemies to join forces is an enduring and 
dangerous characteristic of El Salvador‟s transnational 
criminal evolution. When the conflict ended, thousands of 
combatants on both sides were demobilized into a society 
that offered few jobs or prospects for gainful employment. 
These trained, elite cadres of urban commandos, intelligence 
officers, and clandestine operatives found their skills were 
marketable in the growing criminal structures. Soon the 
groups moved from kidnapping and extortion to providing 
protection services to transnational DTOs and human 
smuggling gangs, car theft rings and other illicit activities.
11
 
                                                             
10
 The investigation was carried out by a special commission formed in 
1992, composed of the nation‟s human rights ombudsman, a 
representative of the United Nations Secretary General, and two 
representatives of the Salvadoran government. The commission was 
formed by a political agreement among all the major parties due to 
resurgence in political violence after the signing of the historic peace 
accords. See: “Informe del Grupo Conjunto Para la Investigación de 
Grupos Armados Ilegales con Motivación Política en El Salvador,” El 
Salvador, July 28, 1994, accessed January 26 at: 
http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/idhuca/grupo.html.    
11
 For a more complete look at the evolution of these gangs, particularly 
the seminal kidnapping of Andrés Shuster, see: Douglas Farah, 
“Organized Crime in El Salvador: The Homegrown and Transnational 
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While these groups had some relationships with TCOs and 
were part of a criminal element, they did not traditionally 
pose a significant threat to the state nor were they fully 
integrated into the TCO structures that used the Salvador 
pipeline. 
 
The consolidation of cocaine market by Mexican DTOs, 
however, has spurred the growth and importance of 
Salvadoran TCOs, both the transportista networks to move 
products and the recruitment of Salvadorans as foot soldiers 
in business. The demand for these services has exploded and 
the value of their services has risen dramatically because of 
the fact that multiple Mexican DTOs, at war with each other 
in Mexico, are seeking to physically control the geographic 
space of the lucrative pipeline routes in from Guatemala to 
Panama. Because of this they are eager to increase their 
military capabilities and intelligence gathering capabilities. 
This, in turn, requires more political access and state 
penetration in order to guarantee the stable movement of 
products across the country, access usually gained through 
corruption, the threat of violence or violence when 
necessary. 
 
As Carlos Dada, a well-known investigative journalist in El 
Salvador who has monitored the drug trafficking situation 
for years noted, the power of the transportistas has increased 
“because they own policemen, judges, congressmen, local 
mayors, etc. So they charge drug cartels for crossing that 
territory free of threats from security forces ― because they 
manage everything. So you pay them ― if you are a drug 
cartel, you pay them. And you have a free pass from 
Honduras to Guatemala.”12 
                                                                                                                            
Dimensions,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 
February 2011. 
12
 Jason Beaubien, “El Salvador Grapples With Upswing in Drug 
Traffic,” NPR Morning Edition, May 31, 2011. 
10 
 
The Salvador recruits for the Mexican DTOs, often identified 
by cartel recruiters using lists of potential candidates 
purchased from those special forces troops they already 
employ, are offered about $4,000 a month as a starting salary 
to work either in the military structures of the cartels or as 
trainers. The advantage that the Salvadoran Special Forces 
recruits offer, according to one source that has been 
approached by the cartels, is that they are immediately 
deployable. Many have also maintained personal contacts 
with networks of intelligence and former comrades across 
the region, bringing immediate entrée into new networks and 
intelligence capabilities.
13
 
 
Against this backdrop, the current situation is characterized 
by:  
 The growing financial and political strength of the 
multiple groups vying for control of the transnational 
pipelines, and the growing recruitment of retired 
special forces members on behalf of Mexican DTOs, 
particularly the Zetas; 
 The physical presence of Mexican DTOs in El 
Salvador and their direct contact with the street 
gangs, particularly the MS-13; 
 The dramatically increased access to intelligence the 
Mexican DTOs and their local allies have achieved; 
 The expanding use of El Salvador, with a dollarized 
economy, as a hub for money laundering, particularly 
since Mexico enacted significant new restrictions on 
dollar transactions; 
 Increased evidence of the sale of sophisticated 
weaponry from the Salvadoran military (and other 
militaries in the region) to Mexican DTOs; 
                                                             
13
 Author interviews with an officer targeted for recruitment and army 
intelligence sources in El Salvador, May and July 2011. 
11 
 
 The growth of small, armed quasi-ideological groups 
of students being recruited by the Venezuelan-
financed Bolivarian axis for training, including 
training of elite cadres in Iran; 
  The growing sophistication and reorganization of 
parts of one of the main gangs (Mara Salvatrucha or 
MS-13) into a more structured transnational criminal 
enterprise that can cooperate and compete with 
Mexican DTOs in-country, and is providing 
increasingly levels of gunmen to the Zetas operating 
in Guatemala and Mexico.  
 
These developments pose a significant new security 
challenge, unprecedented in scale and threat potential, to El 
Salvador, the Central American region, Mexico and 
ultimately the United States. As the political and economic 
power of these local groups providing services to 
transnational criminal organizations grows, new group are 
forming and more sectors of the Salvadoran state are being 
captured by the illicit network structure. 
 
THE MAIN TRANSPORTIST AS NETWORKS IN EL 
SALVADOR 
 
Among the transportista groups that exemplify the new 
generation of transnational criminal activity in El Salvador is 
the Cartel de Texis, named for the town of Texistepeque, 
where some of its leaders come from. Like most of the 
known transportista networks, the Cartel de Texis is not 
new, and has been in operation since at least 2000. Its 
operational territory along the Honduran border includes the 
once famous “ruta del queso” or “cheese route” used to 
smuggle Honduran cheese into El Salvador at the turn of the 
20
th
 century.  
 
 
12 
 
Drug Route from Colombia to El Salvador 
 
Source: http://www.elperiodico.com.gt/es/20110703/domingo/197615/. 
 
In an extensive series of reports, El Salvador‟s online 
investigative newspaper, El Faro, detailed the growing 
importance of the organization and some of its links to 
Mexican DTOs.
14
 A main hub of the group‟s operations is 
the town of San Fernando, Chalatenango, on the border with 
Honduras and close to the Guatemalan border.  
 
The organization is allegedly run by José Adán Salazar 
Umaña, AKA “Chepe Diablo,” a well-known leader of a 
Division 1 soccer team and rancher based in the western city 
of Metapán. The cocaine is reportedly delivered by sea or air 
in Honduras, and then transported overland to the care of 
Cartel de Texis. As described by El Faro, the system works 
seamlessly. 
 
                                                             
14
 Sergio Arauz, Óscar Martínez, and Efrén Lemus, “El Cartel de Texis,” 
El Faro, May 16, 2011, accessed at: 
http://www.elfaro.net/es/201105/noticias/4079/.  
13 
 
San Fernando is the hand-off point where the 
Hondurans hand the drugs off to the 
Salvadorans, on a route directed by Mexicans 
and Colombians. A highway worth millions of 
dollars to those who control it, composed of 
businessmen, ranchers, mayors, police, gang 
members, coyotes [those who handle human 
trafficking], and congressmen. Everyone 
plays a role. The policemen bought by narcos 
guard and move the drugs, remove 
roadblocks and warn of impending 
operations. The mayors give construction 
permits, formalize businesses and act as 
privileged informants―in one case acting as 
a group leader; congressmen give access to 
high levels of power. Gang members kill and 
traffic in local markets; and some judges and 
prosecutors make sure no legal case can 
advance.”15 
 
The trafficking of drugs represented in many ways an easy 
expansion of these long-time illicit transportation pipelines, 
where the protection of customs officials and local law 
enforcement was already established. The addition of 
cocaine to the pipeline added orders of magnitude to the 
profits for all involved but represented relatively little risk to 
the transporters. 
 
What is different is the size of the operations, the amount of 
money made, the level of political influence, and the 
violence that accompanies the group‟s criminal activities and 
the range of Mexican DTOs involved. Salvadoran and 
                                                             
15
 Araúz, Martínez and Lemus, op cit. 
14 
 
regional law enforcement officials said the group was among 
the most important in the region.
16
 
 
 The Cartel de Texis is similar in many regards to another 
transportista network, Los Perrones Orientales, operating on 
the Pacific coast, headquartered in the city of San Miguel 
and using the coastal highway network as the primary 
transportation route to Guatemala. The group modeled itself 
on the Mexican cartels and, imitating the preferences of 
many of the Mexican DTO leaders, imported large numbers 
of thoroughbred horses to race, built expensive car racing 
tracks and commissioned “narco corridos” or songs about 
their exploits, often played on local radio stations.   
 
Most of the cocaine moved by this network arrives on go-
fast boats that drop their cargo in the high seas near the 
coastline with GPS guidance systems attached so they can be 
found. An increasing amount of the deliveries are coming 
through submersible and semi-submersible crafts being built 
in Ecuador and Colombia. In addition to being virtually 
impossible to detect, the newer crafts have the capacity to 
carry up to 10 tons of product, far more than the few hundred 
kilograms the go-fast boats can carry.
 17 
 
Like the operation of the Cartel de Texis, the Perrones 
integrated their corruption in a structured system of 
                                                             
16
 Author interviews with Salvadoran, Guatemalan and international 
regional law enforcement officials, May and June 2011. 
17
 Author interviews with Colombian, U.S. and Mexican intelligence 
officials. Interestingly, the first attempts by the Colombian drug 
traffickers to move to this type of shipment came in 2000, when the 
cartels were found to have plans to construct a Russian submarine, and 
had acquired most of the necessary parts. The groups then moved to 
homemade semi-submersibles, a technology pioneered and likely copied 
from, the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka. While few of the crafts are built in 
Ecuador, many are built near the border region in Esmeraldas and 
launched almost immediately into Ecuadoran waters. 
15 
 
protection for their illicit activities, including police officials, 
local and national politicians, gang members as hired muscle 
and local judges and prosecutors. And like the Texis 
operation, they were able to work with numerous Mexican 
DTOs, from the Zetas to the Sinaloa cartel and even the 
Tijuana organization. They also laundered considerable 
amounts of money through seemingly legitimate business. 
For example, El Salvador‟s Attorney General Office charged 
that the owner of a large car sale business in San Miguel 
gave cars to a National Assembly member belonging to a 
Partido de Conciliación Nacional (National Conciliation 
Party—PCN),  and these cars were used to bribe at least 10 
local mayors and other officials.  Curiously, the car sales 
business claimed to have done $13.2 million worth in sales 
but could only account for about $30,000 of that amount.
18
 
 
When the first arrests of the Perrones began in 2008, several 
senior police officials and several locally powerful 
politicians in the San Miguel area were arrested. According 
to public reports as the investigations unfolded, at least 43 
police officers are under investigation in the case, many of 
them members of the U.S.-funded elite Anti-Narcotics 
Division (División Anti-Narcótico-DAN). Among those 
suspended from his job and still under investigation in the 
case is Godofredo Miranda, who was the DAN 
commander.
19
 
                                                             
18
 Equipo de Nación, "FGR: Los Perrones Dieron Autos a Silva Para 
Pagar Sobornos," La Prensa Gráfica, May 28, 2010. 
19
 Godofredo Miranda was also named by Rep. James McGovern (D-
Mass), as a possible accomplice in the April 1999 murder and rape of a 
9-year-old girl, Katya Miranda, who also requested that President Funes 
investigate the Perrones for possible involvement in the November 2004 
murder of U.S. Teamster labor organizer Gilberto Soto. McGovern's June 
8, 2009 private letter to Funes requesting further investigations into these 
cases was leaked to the Salvadoran press and reported widely but not 
released by McGovern. According to Salvadoran investigators, Soto, 
who was organizing truck drivers in around the port of Usulután, was 
16 
 
According to an internal police report obtained by the author, 
the Perrones organization maintained ties to prominent 
politicians in the eastern region, where the right-wing 
ARENA party has dominated and the National Conciliation 
Party, traditionally linked to the military, remains a force. 
The document outlines the Perrones ties to businesses for 
laundering money, bribes for protection, and ties to extensive 
influence within municipalities in the region.
20
 
 
MONEY MOVEMENTS THROUGH EL SALVADOR  
 
There is broad agreement that the decision to convert El 
Salvador‟s official currency from the Colón to the U.S. 
dollar in 2001 marked a significant change in El Salvador‟s 
national life. While there were numerous reasons for taking 
such a dramatic step, one of the most important collateral 
consequences over time has been to make the tiny nation a 
center of money laundering activities.
21
 
 
As the U.S. State Department noted in its most recent report 
on money laundering : 
 
“El Salvador has an unusually rapidly growing 
banking system with little, other than its 
dollarized economy and remittance flow, to 
support such growth … The country’s dollarized 
economy and geographic location make it an 
                                                                                                                            
killed because he stumbled on the Perrones drug operations in the port 
warehouses and their use of tractor-trailer trucks to move cocaine. For 
more on the ongoing investigation into Miranda, see: Equipo de Nación, 
"Inspectoría Continúa Indagando a Ex-Jefe DAN," La Prensa Gráfica, 
August 31, 2010.  
20
 Confidential internal police report in possession of the author. 
21
 For a comprehensive look at the pros and cons of the dollarization, see: 
David S. Block and William Robert Nelson, Jr., “Dollarization in El 
Salvador: The Costs of Economic Stability,” Latin American Law and 
Business Report, April 30, 2003. 
17 
 
ideal haven for transnational organized crime 
groups, including human and drug trafficking 
organizations. The Central America Four 
Agreement between El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua allows for the free 
movement of citizens of these countries across 
their respective borders without passing through 
immigration or customs inspection. As such, the 
agreement represents a vulnerability to each 
country for the cross-border movement of 
contraband and illicit proceeds of crime.”22 
 
With a poorly regulated banking structure and no need to 
convert from another currency to cash, El Salvador‟s 
booming banking systems is indicative of a significantly 
enhanced role in laundering drug money, particularly since 
the Mexican government has made it more difficult to move 
money directly into Mexico. Sources with direct knowledge 
of illicit money movements in the region said that much of 
the bulk cash that traditionally flowed into Mexico is now 
being moved from the United States to El Salvador and other 
“dollarized” economies (Ecuador and Panama both use the 
U.S. dollar as their official currency), then trucked north 
through Guatemala or placed in the formal banking structure 
through complicit banks.
23
 
 
“There is really nothing easier,” said one source familiar 
with cartel money operations. “If you get the cash to El 
Salvador then there is no problem getting it into the banks, 
because no one asks any questions, and the cartels have 
                                                             
22
 United States Department of State, 2011 International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II: Money Laundering and 
Financial Crimes Country Database, May 20, 2011, accessed at: 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2011/database/164076.htm#El_Salv
ador.  
23
 Author interview with two sources that move drug money in Central 
America, May and July 2011. 
18 
 
prearranged everything. The money goes in as dollars and 
comes out as dollars in „clean‟ account. The cartels can get 
access to it from anywhere in the world and it is washed, 
laundered and dried.”24 
 
In one recent incident that demonstrates the amount of 
money moving through the country, in September 2010 
police investigators found two plastic barrels full of $100 
bills and Euro notes buried on a small farm outside the town 
of Zacatecoluca, in central El Salvador. The first barrel was 
reported to contain $7,196,850 in U.S. dollars and 1,684,500 
Euros, and the second barrel had a similar amount.
25
 
 
A source who has dealt with illicit money flows, suggests 
that:  
The real problem the Mexican cartels are 
having now is how to convert $10 and $20 
bills into larger bills, to reduce the bulk….The 
second is how to move all the money that is 
accumulating in Central America back to 
Mexico or on to Colombia. They have more 
money than they can move comfortably now, 
but no one wants to leave millions of dollars 
in a warehouse. The risk is too high. So there 
is a large bottleneck.
26
 
 
SHIFTING ALLIANCES AND SHIFTING TARGETS 
 
The relationships of Salvadoran transportista organizations 
with Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), 
                                                             
24
 Author interview in Guatemala, June 2011. 
25
 Marcela Solís and Mauricio Bolaños, "Encuentran Segundo Barril con 
Dinero en Zacatecoluca," La Prensa Gráfica (El Salvador), September 4, 
2010.   
26
 Author interview with source that moves drug money in Central 
America, July 2011. 
19 
 
particularly the Sinaloa cartel and Los Zetas are still in flux 
and shift rapidly. However, what is clear is that the 
emergence of the Mexican DTO structures in El Salvador is 
giving both the Mexican organizations and their local 
partners increased resources to hollow out the nation state 
structure by crippling the judicial, law enforcement, 
legislative and regulatory structures.  
 
As the state capture advances, the Mexican DTOs and armed 
groups are more easily able to open the country and the 
region to a growing array of other criminal groups, including 
some such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-FARC) 
from Colombia and Hezbollah from Lebanon, that are 
designated terrorist entities by the United States.  
 
At the same time, as noted above, remnants of the old 
ideological armed structures on both the right and the left 
continue to operate. Of particular concern are groups of 
university students being recruited in small groups and sent 
for ideological training in Venezuela, and then, for the best 
cadres, training in Iran. The training, according to three 
people who have been through the training, is both 
ideological and embracing of armed struggle. 
 
Those trained cadres, in turn, have formed small groups that 
have trained militarily on the outskirts of San Salvador, in 
areas where the FMLN was traditionally active. According to 
two sources with direct knowledge of events, the Bloque 
Popular Juvenil, a self-defined Marxist-Leninist 
organization of the Communist Party, is the primary link 
among these armed groups.
27
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Communist Party, May 2010 and June 2011. 
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The Mexican DTOs are also actively recruiting in El 
Salvador. The Zetas, in particular, are targeting the 
Salvadoran military, and other military and police forces in 
the region, for the purchase of sophisticated weapons. 
Numerous cases made public in the past year indicate that 
the militaries of El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala all 
have had seen military officials sell or attempt to sell 
significant amounts of sophisticated weaponry to Mexican 
DTOs. 
28
   In June 2011, Gen. David Munguía, the 
Salvadoran defense minister, called for a regional effort to 
halt the flow of weapons from the south toward Mexico. 
 
All the militaries of Central America, the 
police, the municipal police, all those with 
weapons, should take measures to insure they 
are not stolen,” Munguía said. “The Mexican 
cartels have established a rearguard area for 
themselves in Central America, a logistics 
base. The cartels that operate in southern 
Mexico and those that operate in Guatemala 
are trying to supply themselves with weapons 
from Central America.
29
 
 
Two cases stand out in El Salvador for their audacity. The 
first was an attempt by six army officials to steal 1,812 
fragmentation grenades that were supposed to be destroyed. 
Rather than blow up the munitions as required, the group 
buried them, staged a fake explosion to demonstrate the 
weapons had been destroyed, and planned to dig them up and 
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sell them to the Zetas. While the group was eventually 
busted, Munguía and other military officials said it had been 
operational for a significant period of time before being 
dismantled.
30
 
 
The second case is more complex with broader international 
implications.  Hector Antonio Martinez Guillén, a recently 
retired army officer known as “el Capitán,” was arrested in 
May 2011 following a sting operation in which he sought to 
provide the FARC in Colombia with plastic explosives, 
automatic rifles and ammunition in exchange for $1 million 
in cocaine. At one point he provided 20 pounds of C-4 
explosives to undercover DEA officials posing as FARC 
representatives.
31
 Given the FARC‟s support by members of 
El Salvador‟s Communist Party and the former officer‟s 
enlistment in a pro-U.S. military, the case shows just how 
irrelevant for ideologies have become. 
 
In addition to the new types of recruitment being carried out 
among former combatants, the traditional gang structure, 
particularly the MS-13, is restructuring many of its “cliques” 
or sub-units, into more disciplined operators who are 
acquiring significantly enhanced military training and 
forging new relationships with the Mexican DTOs, 
particularly the Zetas. As part of this restructuring, 
consumption of drugs is prohibited among gang members, 
the traditional gang tattoos are removed or covered up and 
there is more formal coordination among the leaders on the 
ground in El Salvador and their U.S.-based leaders or leaders 
who are imprisoned in El Salvador. 
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According to two sources who work extensively with the 
gangs, the senior leadership, directed by U.S.-based leaders, 
has developed a working relationship with the Zetas to 
provide militarily trained cadres to work for the organization 
in Guatemala, primarily as security. They are valued, the 
sources said, because they do not have family in the areas 
and have no loyalties or attachments, allowing them to act in 
a more cold-blooded way than local recruits would be 
willing to. 
 
In addition, the sources said, those working with the Zetas 
view themselves as partners in the operation, not as 
subservient to the Mexicans, and some of the money paid the 
gang members by the DTOs goes to support the MS-13, 
rather than to the individual. This is due in part to the fact 
that the Zetas, while maintaining a presence on the ground in 
El Salvador, do not have a way to project significant military 
force there yet, and therefore do not want to take on the 
gangs and try to force them into submission. 
 
Partly as a result of this and the gang‟s own growing strength 
in terms of firepower and control of territory, the MS-13 also 
provides its services to other DTOs that are often in conflict 
with the Zetas. This ability of Salvadoran groups to work 
across the warring factions of Mexican DTOs, at least at this 
time, is an interesting characteristic of the drug trade.
32
 
 
PARALLELS TO THE COLOMBIA CASE  
 
In many ways the current case of TCOs in El Salvador is 
similar to the developments in Colombia in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, when the Medellín and Cali cartels 
predominated and narco violence was at its peak. There are 
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also some significant differences in the situations that make 
direct comparisons more difficult.  
 
Among the similarities are: 
State Penetration and Capture in Specific Points: As the 
cases of the Perrones and the Cartel de Texis show, the 
Salvadoran transportistas have proven themselves adept at 
coopting specific, local political and police structures as well 
as making inroads into the national political and law 
enforcement structures. This closely parallels the strategy of 
the Colombian organizations that generally (with the 
exception of Pablo Escobar at the height of the extradition 
wars in 1989-1991) did not seek direct political power, but 
rather focused on buying protection within the system. Even 
the significant corruption of the constitutional convention of 
1991 in Colombia by the Medellín cartel was aimed 
primarily at banning extradition rather than advancing a 
coherent overall political agenda.
33
 In El Salvador, there are 
significant allegations of senior police corruption, 
particularly in the corridors where cocaine shipments move, 
as well as high-level protection of TOCs within the judicial 
branch and protection by local mayors. 
 
The Culture of Violence: In both cases the illicit activities 
have bred pockets of violence with homicide rates many 
times higher than regional average or historic norm. While 
El Salvador‟s armed conflict formally ended in 1992 and 
Colombia has not reached a negotiated end of the conflict 
with its two largest insurgent groups, in both cases many of 
the smuggling routes and ensuing alliances among regional 
actors have been forged in those conflicts.
34
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Among the most intriguing elements shared by El Salvador 
now and the former situation in Colombia is the emergence 
of young gangs as important foot soldiers in the drug trade, 
similar in many ways to the sicarios or young hit men who 
killed for the cartels, particularly in the comunas or hillside 
slums of Medellín.  
 
In both cases disaffected young men found a type of home or 
social family outside the mainstream society, in groups that 
relied heavily on a culture of violence to engender that 
feeling of community. Both adopted a quasi-religious 
mystique and justification for their actions, praying to 
specific saints or virgins that their aim would be true, while 
idealizing their own mothers, almost to the point of 
veneration. In both cases, father figures are largely absent in 
the family life. 
 
The sicarios, recruited in the comunas, were the cannon 
fodder of the war that raged between the Colombian State 
and the cartels and were driven by a similar sense of life 
being short and the inevitability of violent death that 
pervades the Mara Salvatrucha and Calle 18 gangs in El 
Salvador. In El Salvador, the gangs are undergoing a 
profound transformation but have traditionally been made up 
of alienated young men who expect to die young or spend 
most of their lives in prison.
35
 
 
The End of Ideology: Another disturbing parallel between 
Colombia in more recent years and the situation of violence 
in El Salvador is the demonstrated ability of different groups, 
once separated by ideology, to work together. While already 
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described above in the Salvadoran context, the presence of 
“bandas criminales (BACRIM) in Colombia, a catch-all 
description for emerging criminal gangs, is a similar 
phenomenon. Where once paramilitary groups allied with the 
military fought the Marxist-led FARC, in recent years these 
battle lines have become blurred and merged with drug 
trafficking organizations.  
 
Gen. Oscar Naranjo, Director of the Colombian National 
Police, now considers the BACRIM to be a greater national 
security threat than the FARC, and responsible for more 
violence.
36
 What is most alarming about the BACRIM is that 
they are often made up of former paramilitary members who 
did not demobilize under the controversial amnesty program 
for their groups, as well as deserters from the FARC who 
have lost any semblance of ideological justification for their 
activities. These mixed groups are particularly active on the 
northwestern border with Ecuador, where they are 
sometimes at war and sometimes work together with the 
FARC‟s 48th Front.37  The loss of ideological cohesion and 
the ability of trained units, at one time on different sides of a 
major conflict, to work together usually mark a significant 
advance in creation of sophisticated transnational criminal 
organizations in a region. 
 
Havoc in the Financial System: The barrels of cash found 
in El Salvador are similar to those encountered by 
Colombian cartels during the heyday of the Medellín and 
Cali cartels, when Gonzalo Rodrigo Gacha, Pablo Escobar 
and others, were known to bury millions of dollars on their 
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extensive rural properties. And like El Salvador, Colombia 
saw an explosion of banking activity that would be hard to 
justify in normal economic terms. The circulation of such 
large amounts of illicit money has numerous consequences 
on the legal economic structure. The primary one is to drive 
legitimate businesses out of the market and a secondary is to 
provide enormous amounts of money that amplify the ability 
of drug traffickers or their allies to buy their way into the 
system for protection.
38
 Years after reducing the existential 
threat of the drug cartels to the state and the passage of 
numerous laws to combat the flow of illicit funds, Colombia 
is still struggling to make headway against this phenomenon.  
 
Among the differences between El Salvador and Colombia 
are: 
Insurgency against the government: There are significant 
differences between the situations of violence and illicit 
activities between El Salvador now Colombia in the 
late1980s and early 1990s. El Salvador now does not have an 
organized, armed insurgency fighting to overthrow the 
government, in contrast to the FARC and ELN insurgencies 
in Colombia. No centralized group with an identifiable 
leader has emerged such as Pablo Escobar and the Medellín 
cartel in the Colombian context, followed by the Cali cartel, 
the Northern Valley organizations and others. While El 
Salvador has identifiable transportista structures such as Los 
Perrones and the Cartel de Texis, these groups tend to work 
for a variety of DTOs, and are themselves without a 
coherent, integrated, overarching structure. 
 
Historically, while Colombian organizations focused on 
cocaine smuggling, Salvadoran organizations focused on the 
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movement of migrants seeking to illegally enter the United 
States. These illicit pipelines are increasingly becoming 
merged and indistinguishable, but each set of pipelines 
serves a different purpose. 
 
Transnational Structures: Perhaps one of the most notable 
differences between the situation in Colombia and the 
current situation in El Salvador has to do with the 
transnational structures of DTOs. Sicarios in Escobar‟s 
empire but did not have a transnational structure that reached 
into major cities in the United States and neighboring 
countries, and the Salvadoran gang structures do. The 
sicarios were more directly employed in the cartel structure 
than most of the gang operations in El Salvador, and the 
Colombian DTOs at the time generally did not work with 
non-Colombians in any significant way. There were a few 
exceptions but the transportation structures relied largely on 
air transport to U.S. territory and Colombian control of major 
retail operations to wholesalers. Thus, there was seldom a 
need to negotiate with the transportista networks to move 
products. In contrast, the Mexican organizations use more 
land and sea routes and actively seek to control the territory 
through which their products pass. This gives the Mexican 
DTOs the impetus to develop a wide range of relationships 
with groups that are not directly integrated into the 
trafficking structure but who are vital to the success of the 
enterprise. 
 
THE ROAD AHEAD 
 
El Salvador, like the rest of Central America, is rapidly 
reaching a tipping point in its ability to successfully tackle, 
even in a limited sense, the multiple issues in combating 
transnational organized crime and the money that flows from 
those organizations. This constitutes a direct threat to the 
nation‟s fragile democratic process and post-war recovery by 
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hollowing out the state and draining enormous amounts of 
resources from the legitimate economy. 
 
As it has in recent years, El Salvador, with its extensive and 
lightly guarded land and sea borders and ideally situated 
geographically as a transshipment point, will likely continue 
to grow in importance. What sets El Salvador apart from 
other nations in the region at this point is that it remains 
meeting and recruitment ground for multiple Mexican DTOs, 
rather than territory largely controlled by a single 
organization. In contrast, Guatemala is a significant area of 
influence of the Zetas while Honduras remains a stronghold 
for the Sinaloa cartel. 
 
Given the demonstrated adaptive capacity of the gangs in El 
Salvador and their growing sophistication and ties to the 
Mexican DTOs, it is likely these groups will continue to 
expand their territorial control and become more integrated 
into the armed structure of larger organizations. 
 
As the cases of the Cartel de Texis and Los Perrones show, 
El Salvador‟s primary value added to the cocaine pipeline is 
to successfully move illicit products across the territory they 
control before handing the goods off to Mexican 
organizations. This multi-national transportista network, tied 
together both through the gangs and through long-standing 
smuggling networks, has an extensive reach into the 
political, law enforcement and judicial structures of El 
Salvador and most of the rest of the Central American 
region. Given the time it has taken to begin to unravel known 
groups and the political cost of doing so, these groups will 
likely continue to grow in power and influence. 
 
Organized crime in El Salvador has now reached the point 
where it is transnational in nature and more integrated into 
stronger, more versatile global networks such, as the 
29 
 
Mexican DTOs. It is a hybrid of both local crime ―with 
gangs vying for control of specific geographic space so they 
can extract payment for the safe passage of illicit products― 
and transnational groups that need to use that space to 
successfully move their products. These symbiotic 
relationships are both complex and generally transient in 
nature but growing more consolidated and dangerous. 
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interviews with law enforcement and intelligence officials in 
Central America, as well as with individuals involved in 
transnational criminal and gang activities. Due to the 
sensibility and risks for the sources if identified by name, the 
author has used the information anonymously.   The author 
also interviewed law enforcement officials in Ecuador and 
Colombia in November 2010. 
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